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ABSTRACT 
A key challenge facing most emerging market economies today is how to simultaneously 
maintain monetary independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration subject 
to the constraints imposed by the Trilemma, in an era of widespread globalization. In this 
paper we overview and contrast the Trilemma policy choices and tradeoffs faced by the 
two key drivers of global economic growth-China and India. China’s Trilemma 
configurations are unique relative to other emerging markets in the predominance of 
exchange rate stability, and in the failure of the Trilemma regression to capture a 
consistently significant role for financial integration. In contrast, the Trilemma 
configurations of India are in line with choices made by other emerging countries. India 
like other emerging economies has overtime converged towards a middle ground between 
the three policy objectives, and has achieved comparable levels of exchange rate stability 
and financial integration buffered by sizeable international reserves.  
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1. Introduction 
  The Great Recession that originated in 2008 has raised questions about the current 
international financial architecture as well as individual countries’ international 
macroeconomic policies. Policy makers dealing with the current global crisis are 
confronted with the “Impossible Trinity” or the “Trilemma”- a potent paradigm of open 
economy macroeconomics, asserting that a country may not simultaneously target the 
exchange rate, conduct an independent monetary policy, and have full financial 
integration. A key message of the Trilemma is scarcity of policy instruments. Policy 
makers face a tradeoff, wherein increasing one Trilemma variable (for e.g. higher 
financial integration) induces a drop in the weighted average of the other two variables 
(i.e. lower exchange rate stability, or lower monetary independence, or a combination of 
the two). Analyzing and understanding the predictions of the Trilemma hypothesis under 
such mixed or hybrid regimes has now become a key challenge to policy makers and 
practitioners alike, especially as countries all over the world recover from the effects of 
the Great Recession.1 
 The rapid as well as massive financial globalization of most countries of the world 
over the past 20 years, and the fast deepening of domestic and international financial 
markets have modified the context of the Trilemma paradigm. Most emerging market 
economies in particular have opted for increasing financial integration. The Trilemma 
implies that a country choosing this path of higher capital mobility has to either forego 
exchange rate stability if it intends to preserve certain degree of monetary independence, 
or give up monetary independence if it wishes to retain exchange rate stability. As noted 
in Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2008), over the last couple of decades emerging market 
economies have consistently pursued a balanced combination of the three 
macroeconomic policy goals along with a substantial amount of international reserve (IR) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010) for further discussion and references dealing with 
the Trilemma, and Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2008, 2010b, 2010c, 2011) for testing a continues 
version of the Trilemma tradeoffs. Related papers have discussed the possibility that a pegged 
exchange rate is a trap in the era of greater financial integration (e.g., Edwards and Levy-Yeyati, 
2005; Aizenman and Glick, 2009).  
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holding. Emerging markets have mostly opted for hybrid exchange rate regimes - 
managed exchange rate flexibility buffered by holding sizeable IR while increasing 
financial integration and reducing the importance given to monetary independence. In 
other words, among this group of countries, the three dimensions of the Trilemma 
configurations: monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial openness, 
are increasingly converging towards a “middle ground”.  
 All of these issues are highly pertinent in the context of the two major emerging 
market economies, namely China and India. Economists, policymakers and practitioners 
in recent debates and discussions, make an inevitable comparison between these two 
rising giants in Asia, which together account for one third of the world population, and 
also happen to be the world’s emerging super-powers displaying spectacular economic 
ascent over the past couple of decades. While India is the eleventh largest economy by 
nominal GDP, China occupies the second position surpassing Japan and after the US.  
 China and India are both large, poor countries facing similar challenges in 
developing their economies and both have benefited from greater integration into the 
world economy. In both countries, financial systems and markets were regulated and 
controlled for a long period of time and were largely dominated by publicly owned 
enterprises. In recent decades however, both countries have moved towards market-
driven economies through financial and trade liberalization. While economic 
liberalization and deregulation policies were introduced in India in the 1990s, China 
started receiving foreign direct investment from the mid-1980s onwards.  
 The similarities of India and China (their size, timing of takeoffs, and the 
challenges facing them) raise important questions: Are these similarities reflected in the 
macroeconomic Trilemma configurations adopted by China and India?  What are the 
implications of any differential choice of the Trilemma configurations made by these two 
Asian giants?  This paper attempts to address these issues using the framework of the 
Trilemma and in the context of the macro history of China and India in the last two 
decades. 
  China has been pursuing the objective of greater financial openness albeit more 
cautiously than emerging economies elsewhere. As detailed in Glick and Hutchison 
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(2008), in order to deal with the Trilemma policy trade-offs, China has recently allowed 
more exchange rate flexibility. However growing balance of payments surpluses through 
both current and financial accounts have put upward pressure on its currency -- the 
Renminbi. Chinese monetary authorities have been actively intervening in the foreign 
exchange market thereby accumulating massive amounts of IR, so as to prevent the 
currency from appreciating. Between 1990 and 2010, China’s holdings of IR have risen 
from close to $29 billion (8.3 percent of GDP) to over $2.8 trillion (close to 50 percent of 
GDP). 
  As China continues to slowly liberalize its capital account while actively 
intervening in the foreign exchange market to stabilize its currency, it faces the key 
challenge of retaining domestic monetary policy autonomy and hence maintaining price 
stability. In the recovery from the Great Recession of 2008-09, China has been facing 
serious credit-boom fueled inflationary concerns. Chinese monetary authorities have 
addressed this current challenge by raising banks’ reserve requirement ratios. However, 
in the pursuit of higher financial openness and exchange rate stability, China is facing the 
crucial trade-off of having to give up monetary policy independence. Clearly, the extent 
to which China will successfully confront the Trilemma problem depends on achieving 
the right balance of policy objectives.  
 India too fits the general pattern of most emerging market economies operating in a 
range of partial financial integration and managed floating exchange rate regimes 
accompanied by massive accumulation of IR. Following a balance of payments crisis in 
1991, a comprehensive series of liberalization, privatization and deregulation policies 
were implemented in the banking sector, trade sector as well as financial markets. Over 
the next couple of decades the Indian economy witnessed several structural changes 
(Shah, 2008; Mohan and Kapur, 2009; Hutchison, Sengupta, Singh, 2011). However, 
with regard to capital account liberalization, Indian policy-makers adopted a cautious 
stance from the very start (Hutchison, Kendall, Pasricha and Singh, 2010) as a result of 
which the process has been a continuous albeit a slow and gradual one. 
 The Indian economy was among the first to recover from the global crisis of 2008-
09. While in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, capital outflows, higher exchange rate 
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volatility and loss of reserves to limit exchange rate depreciation presented a 
contractionary influence on domestic monetary policy, the scenario has changed rapidly 
in 2009-10 as capital inflows began surging again. (Hutchison, Sengupta, Singh, 2011). 
Moreover, growing inflationary pressures (headline WPI inflation averaging around 10 
percent) have forced the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to resort to rate hikes and hence 
adopt a tighter monetary policy. The RBI now clearly faces the challenge to strike a 
balance between maintaining exchange rate stability and regaining monetary autonomy in 
the face of growing capital inflows. All these economic developments and structural 
changes, both in domestic and international environments may surely be expected to 
influence the effective policy tradeoffs between the Trilemma choices facing the Indian 
policy makers.  
In this paper, we trace the evolution of the Financial Trilemma in China and India 
over time from 1990 to 2010 and analyze the extent of the tradeoffs faced by policy 
makers in both countries, between financial integration, monetary independence and 
exchange rate stability. We calculate a Trilemma index for each of the two countries 
separately using a methodology developed for a cross-section of countries by Aizenman, 
Chinn and Ito-henceforth ACI (2008, 2010a, b and c, 2011). We also analyze the impact 
of the evolving Trilemma configurations on macroeconomic indicators such as inflation 
and examine the role of international reserves in the context of China and India’s 
Trilemma.  
We find that China’s Trilemma configurations are unique relative to the one 
characterizing other emerging markets in the predominance of exchange rate stability and 
in the failure of the Trilemma regression to capture any consistently significant role for 
financial integration. One possible interpretation is that the fragmentation of the domestic 
capital market in China, its array of capital controls and the large hoarding of IR imply 
that the “policy interest rate” does not reflect the stance of monetary policy. In contrast, 
the Trilemma configurations of India are in line with the regression results of other 
emerging countries as reported in ACI (2008) and are consistent with the predictions of 
the Trilemma tradeoffs. India like other emerging economies has overtime converged 
towards a middle ground between the three policy objectives (i.e. increased financial 
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integration, managed exchange rate flexibility and active monetary policy) buffered by 
sizeable international reserves.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
We follow the methodology of ACI (2008, 2010a, b and c, 2011), henceforth ACI, in 
constructing indices for each of the Trilemma policy objectives, namely, monetary 
independence, exchange rate stability and capital account openness. However, while ACI 
analyze the Trilemma configurations for a host of countries and study the implications 
thereof, we do so individually for two key emerging market economies, namely China 
and India and compare our results. In order to have more observations in our dataset and 
hence more time variation for a single country, we use quarterly data as opposed to 
annual data used in their analysis. We also use a different measure of capital account 
openness than ACI.  
For China, our data set extends from 1990Q1 to 2010Q4 spanning as many as 84 
quarters. For the monetary independence index, we use weekly data on the lending rates 
in China and 3-month LIBOR rates in US to compute quarterly correlations, as described 
in the next sub-section. For the exchange rate stability index, we use the weekly series of 
Renminbi-Dollar exchange rates to compute quarterly standard deviations, again as 
delineated in the next subsection. All above-mentioned data are obtained from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the International Monetary Fund.  In 
order to compute the capital openness index we use data from the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE) on outward and inward FDI, Portfolio and Other types of 
capital flows as well as GDP data from IFS. Later on, for calculating China’s inflation 
rate, we use consumer price index (CPI) data from Global Financial Statistics and 
compute the YoY inflation rate using the quarterly CPI data. Finally to examine the 
impact of IR we use quarterly data on foreign exchange reserves minus gold, from IFS 
and normalize it by quarterly GDP.  
For India, our data ranges from 1990Q1 to 2010Q4. For the Trilemma indices, we use 
quarterly data on GDP, foreign investment inflows and outflows, from the International 
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Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the IMF. Same as for China, we use weekly 
exchange rate series to construct a quarterly index of exchange rate stability, as described 
below. The weekly, nominal Rupee-to-US dollar exchange rate series is from the Global 
Financial Database. From the same source, we use weekly 90-day rates on 
government/treasury securities for the US and India to calculate quarterly correlations 
used to create the monetary independence index.  Later on we use quarterly data on 
wholesale price index (WPI) to calculate YoY inflation and data on foreign exchange 
reserves minus gold to analyze the impact of reserves management and Trilemma indices 
on inflation, both series obtained from the IFS database.  
     The monetary independence (MI), exchange rate stability (ES) and capital account 
openness (KO) indices are constructed as follows for each of the two countries and each 
index has been rescaled to lie between 0 and 1.2 
 
MI Index 
     Adapting the same approach as in ACI (2008), we measure MI as the reciprocal of the 
correlation of quarterly interest rates in the home country (here China and India, 
respectively) and the base country (the United States). We calculate quarterly correlations 
using weekly interest rate data. The precise formula is as follows: 
 
By definition the index lies between 0 and 1. The highest value indicates the greatest 
degree of monetary independence. The plots of the MI indices for China and India 
respectively are shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
ES Index 
     We calculate the ES index using quarterly standard deviations of the weekly change in 
the log of the LCU-US Dollar exchange rate (in this case the RMB-USD exchange rate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For the rescaling we follow a standard algorithm wherein the rescaled index=(Actual index-
Minimum value of the series)/(Max-Min of the series).  
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for China and the Rupee-USD exchange rate for India). The formula used for the 
construction of the index is as follows: 
 
 
Like the MI Index, by definition the ES index ranges from 0 to 1 and the higher the value 
the greater is the exchange rate stability. The evolution of the ES indices for China and 
India during our sample period is shown in Figures 3 and 4, respectively.   
 
KO Index 
     We depart from ACI (2008) for the construction of the KO index in that instead of 
using the Chinn-Ito index (that gives a number between 0 and 1 for a country’s financial 
openness), we use a simple de-facto measure of capital account openness. We define the 
KO index as the ratio of the sum of inward and outward foreign investment flows to 
GDP, and we consider three types of capital flows-FDI, Portfolio and Others, as reported 
by SAFE for China and the IFS for India.  
     During our sample period, slow and gradual changes have been taking place as 
regards the capital account openness policy of both China and India and the Chinn-Ito 
index may not necessarily capture these continuous changes very well. As a robustness 
check, we also construct a second KO index measure wherein we weigh the different 
types of capital flows by their respective annual volatility. One drawback of our measures 
is that the KO indices are not bound between 0 and 1 by construct. In order to resolve this 
issue we rescale both un-weighted and volatility-weighted measures of the KO index 
[rescaled index=(Actual index-Minimum value of the series)/(Max-Min of the series)] 
such that the indices lie between 0 and 1 and hence are comparable in values to the other 
two indices, namely MI and ES. The time-series evolution of the KO indices using both 
the weighted and un-weighted definitions for China and India have been presented in 
Figures 5-8. All data details and descriptions have been presented in a Table in the 
Appendix.  
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      The Trilemma represents a binding trade-off between three policy objectives. 
Accordingly, the main principle governing the methodology of the Trilemma estimation 
is that an increase in any one of the three indices has to be balanced by a corresponding 
decrease in one or two of the other indices, so that the constraint can be a binding one. 
However, policy makers can choose to attain a combination of the three policy goals as 
well subject to the constraint that neither of the indices reaches its maximum value. If all 
three goals are simultaneously desirable, then whichever index has a higher value 
represents the policy objective that authorities or central bankers want to focus on more. 
This principle can be empirically captured using the methodology from ACI (2008).  
Since there is no specific functional form of the policy trade-offs or the linkages 
of these three policy goals, following ACI (2008) we test the simplest functional 
specification for the three Trilemma indices and examine whether the three Trilemma 
policy goals are linearly related. Thus the approach we use here for the estimation is to 
regress a constant (in our case, two) on all three indices at the same time, omitting the 
constant term on the right hand side of the regression equation. Specifically we examine 
the goodness of fit of the following linear regression:  
€ 
2 = ai(MI)it + bi(ES)it + ci(KO)it +ε it      (1) 
 
where i= China or India. The estimated coefficients in the above regression should give 
us some approximate ideas regarding the weights attached by policy makers to the three 
policy goals. Moreover, if we find that the goodness of fit for the above regression model 
is high, it would suggest that a linear specification is rich enough to explain the trade off 
faced by policy makers among the three policy objectives. Thus, unlike ACI (2008), here 
we use a time series for a single country to estimate the Trilemma configurations.  
Both China and India underwent several changes in their respective exchange rate 
regimes during the sample period. So apart from the baseline estimations for the full 
sample, we also identify four sub-periods for each of the two countries and then estimate 
equation (1) for each sub-period as an additional analysis. In the case of China, between 
December 1989 and end of 1993, Chinese RMB went through a phase of devaluation. 
Then on January 1994, official and swap markets were unified which amounted to a 
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massive devaluation against the USD. 1994 was an important break point in the exchange 
rate regime, based on actual events rather than statistical tests so far and thus the first 
sub-period we identify is 1990Q1-1994Q1. When the two rates were unified in 1994, the 
currency was revalued till October 1997. Accordingly the second sub-period is 1994Q2-
1997Q4. From November 1997 to July 2005 (before the initiation of the reforms), RMB 
fluctuated vis-à-vis USD in a very narrow range. So the third sub-period that we identify 
is 1998Q1-2005Q3. In July 2005, China switched to a new exchange rate regime wherein 
the rate was set with reference to a basket of currencies thereby signifying a shift away 
from a dollar peg. The currency was allowed to ‘float’ more freely. Accordingly the final 
sub-period is 2005Q4-2010Q4.  
 In the case of India the changes in exchange rate regime were relatively less 
prominent. So we split the sample into four equal sub-periods roughly coinciding with 
some regime changes as explained in Shah, Patnaik, Sethy and Balasubramaniam (2011). 
The four sub-periods are 1990Q1-1995Q1, 1995Q2-2000Q2, 2000Q3-2005Q3 and 
2005Q4-2010Q4. 
 According to ACI (2008), policymakers in emerging economies balance the 
different trade-offs presented by the Trilemma in the short run through their reserve 
management policies. In other words, they view reserves as a fourth dimension of these 
policy-trade offs.  In Figures 11 and 12 we present the evolution of different 
configurations of the Trilemma policy objectives for China and India respectively, along 
with their reserves to GDP ratios, over the sub-periods. For each country we plot the 
averages of each index over each sub-period using the ‘diamond chart’ popularized by 
ACI (2008). Figure 11 shows that over time China’s policy stance has become more and 
more skewed towards the ES objective at the expense of KO and especially MI. On the 
other hand Figure 12 demonstrates that India over time has moved more towards the 
middle of the diamond implying that like EMEs, India has been balancing all three policy 
objectives and attaining a somewhat middle-ground perhaps through changes in its 
reserves stock.  
Estimation results for both countries are reported in Tables 1-4 and results are 
discussed in detail in the next section.  
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3.1 Empirical Results: Trilemma Policy Stance 
     The baseline estimation results for China are reported in Table 1. In Column 1 we use 
the KO index as defined in the previous section. In Column 2 of Table 1, we use a 
weighted version of the KO index wherein the different types of capital flows (FDI, 
portfolio and others) are weighted by their respective volatilities. In both regressions the 
the estimated coefficients of the ES index are statistically significant and also have higher 
magnitudes than the other two indices implying that China has clearly been placing more 
priority on minimizing exchange rate fluctuations as a tool for macroeconomic 
management. While the MI index also has statistically significant coefficients, the weight 
attached to it is clearly less than the ES index as seen from the size of the coefficients. 
Capital account openness does not come out to be statistically significant in our baseline 
estimation in Column 1 and is only marginally significant at 10% level in Column 2. The 
overall model-fit is also extremely good as reflected in the high R-squared numbers.3 The 
adjusted R-squared is found to be above 98 percent, which indicates that the three policy 
goals are linearly related to each other, that is, policy makers in China do indeed face the 
trade-off among the three policy goals. 
 The predominance of exchange rate stability as a policy objective becomes even 
more prominent when we look at the sub-periods in Table 3. Once again the one result 
that stands out in Table 3 across all sub-periods is the consistent statistical significance of 
the ES index compared to the other two indices. The exchange rate stabilization objective 
has also been given more policy weight perhaps at the behest of monetary independence 
and capital account openness.  
We now turn to the baseline estimation results for India in Table 2 wherein 
Columns 1 and 2 show estimation results using the un-weighted and volatility-weighted 
KO indices respectively. The findings are strikingly different than China. All three 
indices are consistently and statistically significant in the regressions in both Columns 1 
and 2. Going by the size of the estimated coefficients, exchange rate stability and 
financial integration are given marginally more importance followed by monetary 
autonomy. These results for India are overall consistent with those found in ACI (2008) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Since there is no constant term on the right hand side, the R-squared is non-centered.  
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for a broader group of EMEs. Among this group the policy combination of exchange rate 
stability and financial openness has been the most dominant over the past two decades. 
The results in Table 4 also point at similar conclusions. All three policy objectives come 
out significant for India with relatively higher weight being placed on the ES index.  
Putting the regression results in the broader perspective, China’s Trilemma 
configurations are unique relative to the one characterizing other emerging countries both 
in the predominance of exchange rate stability, and in the failure of the Trilemma 
regression to capture a consistently significant role for financial integration. In contrast, 
the Trilemma configurations of India are in line with the regression results of ACI (2008, 
2010a, b and c, 2011), and are consistent with the predictions of the Trilemma tradeoffs.  
One possible interpretation is that the fragmentation of the domestic capital market in 
China and the capital controls applied there implies that the “policy interest rate” is not 
reflective of the stance of monetary policy.  This would be the case if a large share of 
borrowing is allocated directly by the state banking system, with preferential treatment of 
the state owned enterprises (SOE), and if the supply of credit to the private sector is 
segmented.  Another unique feature of China is a combination of more stringent capital 
controls and massive hoarding of IR. China has been increasing its IR/GDP relentlessly 
without signs of convergence to a target IR/GDP during the sample period.  These 
policies may relax the Trilemma constraints in the intermediate run, as is suggested by 
ACI (2010b, c and d). Furthermore, the emergence of endogenous capital flows 
circumventing the controls in China (including trade mis-invoicing) may reduce the 
explanatory power of the Trilemma variables in China. Needless to say, these conjectures 
need further investigations.  
In contrast, the Trilemma configurations of India and the tradeoffs among the 
policy goals there are in line with the results of other emerging markets.  This is reflected 
both by the significant positive sign of the Trilemma variables, and by the “middle 
ground” choices of India, in line with the trend among most other emerging economies 
[see ACI (2010a, b and c)]. Overtime the Trilemma configuration that has evolved in 
India is one of greater exchange rate stability and financial integration, combined with an 
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attempt to retain monetary autonomy through active intervention in foreign exchange 
markets.  
We also graphically demonstrate the contributions of the Trilemma policy 
objectives over time, for both China and India in Figures 13 and 14 respectively.4 Once 
again for China, it is clearly evident that exchange rate stability has been assigned the 
maximum weight in the Trilemma trade-offs whereas in India, over time, all three policy 
objectives seem to matter in the overall trade-off. The contributions add up to almost to 
two (trilemma constant) for both countries in each sample period implying relatively high 
goodness of fit of the model estimated. 
 
3.2 Empirical Results: Trilemma and Inflation 
In this section we examine econometrically how various choices regarding the 
three policies affect inflation in both China and India. Inflation is a leading indicator of 
macroeconomic stability.5 The effect on inflation of the various Trilemma policy choices, 
independently as well as in conjunction with international reserves can throw some useful 
insights on how to manage inflation. This is especially pertinent in recent times since 
both China and India are now confronted with serious domestic inflationary pressures. 
Given this, we empirically explore the linkages between inflation and our time-varying 
measures of the policy goals associated with the Trilemma configuration. In particular we 
estimate the following model:  
 	   (2)	  	  
where, yit is a measure for YoY inflation calculated using quarterly data, for country i 
(China or India) in year t.6 TLMit is a vector of any two of the three Trilemma indices, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Contributions are measured by multiplying the estimated coefficient of each index from Tables 
3 and 4 with the respective series average for each sub-period. 5	  While ACI (2008) also look at the effect of Trilemma on output volatility, for our study output 
data is not available for sufficiently high frequencies to allow construction of a quarterly output 
volatility series for individual countries. That is another reason why we focus on inflation alone.	  	  
6 While consumer price index is used for China, in case of India we use the wholesale price index 
to calculate inflation. 
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namely, MI, ES, and KO. (IR/GDP)it is the level of international reserves (excluding gold) 
as a ratio to GDP. [TLMit x (IR/GDP)it] is an interaction term between the Trilemma 
indices and the IR/GDP.  is a vector of country-specific determinants of inflation such 
as output growth rate (quarterly growth rate of real GDP) and  money growth rate 
(quarterly growth rate of money supply or M1). The effect of the interaction terms will 
help to identify whether IR complement or act as a substitute for other policy stances.7 
Our objective is to analyze the impact of the evolving Trilemma configurations on 
domestic inflation in both countries and to investigate how has the surge in IR 
accumulation affected this macroeconomic policy dynamics.    
Results of the estimation are reported in Tables 5 and 6 respectively for China and 
India. In case of China, higher IR/GDP increases inflation at a rate that increases with 
MI.  If IR/GDP is 0.5, the net coefficient on MI for China is 0.045 (0.27*0.5 - 0.09), 
positive, yet it is negative for IR/GDP of 0.2.  This suggests that high IR hoarding may 
induce inflationary pressure with a given MI. It also seems that throughout most of the 
sample, both countries managed to sterilize effectively, preventing spillover effects from 
hoarding international reserves to domestic prices. This is reflected in the insignificant 
coefficient of the IR/GDP in columns 1, 3 and 5, in the baseline regressions with no 
interaction terms in both Tables 5 and 6.  Adding the interaction terms does not change 
this result much. While the direct effect of IR/GDP is positive, evaluating the marginal 
impact of increasing IR/GDP on inflation, conditioning it on the sample levels of MI, ES, 
and KO indicates that the marginal impact of higher IR/GDP was close to nil.8  This 
result may reflect the financial repression stance of both countries, where the authorities 
occasionally adjusted banks’ reserve/deposit rates at times of abundance liquidity.  Yet, 
this result should be taken with a grain of salt, as it reflects the average patters observed 
during sample period, and thereby is backward looking.  As IR/GDP trends upwards in 
both countries, reaching more than 50 percent in China, past experience does not 
guarantee the success of future sterilization. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Since output data is not available for sufficiently high frequencies to allow construction of a 
quarterly output volatility series, we focus on inflation alone.  
8 To illustrate, note that column 2 implies that .  Substituting 
the sample averages of the Trilemma indices into the regression results suggests that the marginal 
effect of raising IR/GDP on the inflation was practically nil.   
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In the case of China, monetary independence seems to have no statistically 
significant effect on inflation. However, greater exchange rate stability, as well as capital 
market openness, seem to have come at the cost of higher inflation.  This may reflect the 
real exchange rate appreciation induced by the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, 
where nominal exchange rate stability induces higher inflation rate. This interpretation 
suggests that greater exchange rate flexibility, allowing nominal appreciation, would 
reduce inflation in China.  This view is consistent with the long run neutrality of 
exchange rate regimes.  In a fast growing economy, a choice in favor of exchange rate 
stability overtime shifts the adjustment to appreciating real exchange rate from the 
nominal exchange rate appreciation to the domestic inflation.    
For India, on the other hand, monetary autonomy is positively related to inflation.  
Similarly to China, greater exchange rate stability has been associated with higher 
inflation, possibly again due to the real exchange rate appreciation associated with rapid 
growth. Capital account openness does not seem to have a major effect on inflation in this 
case. It is possible that greater ES may have been adopted to reduce inflation in future 
periods. Also to be noted that if IR/GDP in India is 0.15, the net effect of ES on inflation 
is positive (0.1*1.5-1).  Similarly, MI will increase inflation if there is no attempt to use 
MI to target a low inflation. Once again capital account openness is associated with 
higher inflation. A surge of capital inflows may often lead to overheated asset prices in 
the stock market as well as in the real estate sector, which in turn could feed, into 
inflation. On the other hand, if the capital inflows are absorbed into higher reserve 
accumulation through sterilized intervention by the RBI in the foreign exchange market, 
then the transmission into higher prices is likely to be subdued—this could explain the 
significant, negative coefficient of the interaction term between KO and IR/GDP in the 
case of both China and India.   
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 A key challenge facing most emerging market economies today is how to 
simultaneously maintain monetary independence, exchange rate stability and financial 
integration subject to the constraints imposed by the Financial Trilemma, in an era of 
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deepening globalization. In this paper we study the Trilemma choices of the two key 
drivers of global growth, China and India which together account for one third of the 
world population, rank among the front-runners of the global economy and are among the 
biggest and fastest growing developing countries. Their success stories are defined by 
consistently high growth rates of both aggregate and per capita incomes in recent 
decades, competing aggressively in the global markets.    
 We overview and contrast the policy choices followed by these two countries 
during 1990-2010 and empirically test their Trilemma tradeoffs. We calculate a Trilemma 
index for each of the two countries separately, analyze the impact of the evolving 
Trilemma configurations on macroeconomic indicators such as inflation and examine the 
role of international reserves in the context of their Trilemma. We find that China’s 
Trilemma configurations are quite unique relative to the one characterizing other 
emerging markets. China has clearly been placing more priority on minimizing exchange 
rate fluctuations as a tool for macroeconomic management during the period of our 
analysis. The predominance of exchange rate stability has been achieved to some extent 
at the expense of monetary autonomy and financial integration. On the other hand, we 
find that India has overtime converged towards a middle ground between the three policy 
objectives, and has achieved comparable levels of exchange rate stability and financial 
integration buffered by sizeable international reserves.  
 The comparative Trilemma analysis of China and India as presented here is quite 
pertinent in the current global economic scenario. The Global Financial Crisis proved the 
short-run resilience of both countries-the two fastest growing economies that kept the 
global growth engine moving despite stagnation in the developed world. However in 
recent times both countries seem to be facing significant domestic economic challenges 
as well as adverse external shocks originating from the Euro zone slow down.  
 In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, India is struggling to deal with its 
fiscal and current account deficits as well as a high domestic inflation rate. In 2010, 
annual average whole-sale price inflation was as high as 10.2 percent. The Reserve Bank 
of India has been raising interest rates consistently since November 2010 to counter 
inflation that went into the double digits fueled by growing consumer demand and 
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increasing food and fuel prices. Growth has also slowed down significantly from 9% to 
6% in the last 2 years. China on the other hand is grappling with slowing exports given 
the global economic slowdown. Uncertainty is also looming large about the growing non-
performing loans in the domestic banking system. Against this background, it will be 
interesting to see how the Trilemma policy trade-offs evolve for both these economies in 
the years to come, especially as the global economy recovers from the Great Recession.  
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Appendix: Data Details and Sources 
Variable Name Description Components Data Sources 
MI Monetary 
Independence 
Index: As 
defined in Text 
Domestic and US 
interest rates 
China: Weekly Lending rates from International 
Financial Statistics Database (IFS) 
India: Weekly 90-day rates on government securities 
from Global Financial Database (GFD) 
Interest rate (USA): 3 month LIBOR from IFS 
ES Exchange Rate 
Stability: As 
defined in Text 
Domestic 
Exchange Rate 
(LCU/USD) 
China: Weekly RMB/USD exchange rate from IFS. 
India: Weekly Rupee/USD exchange rate from GFD. 
 
KO Capital Openness 
Index: Sum of 
Capital Inflows 
and Outflows 
divided by GDP 
FDI, Portfolio 
and Other 
inflows and 
outflows and 
GDP 
China: Quarterly FDI, Portfolio and Other flows from 
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE); 
GDP from IFS.  
India: Foreign investment inflows and outflows from 
IFS.  
 
Volatility-
Weighted KO 
Sum of each type 
of capital flows 
weighted by 
respective 
volatilities, 
divided by GDP 
FDI, Portfolio 
and Other 
inflows and 
outflows and 
GDP 
China: Quarterly FDI, Portfolio and Other flows from 
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE); 
GDP from IFS.  
India: Foreign investment inflows and outflows from 
IFS.  
 
IR/GDP International 
Reserves to GDP 
Ratio 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Reserves minus 
gold and GDP 
Reserves and GDP from IFS  
Inflation YoY Inflation 
calculated using 
quarterly price 
index data 
Consumer Price 
Index for China 
and Wholesale 
Price Index for 
India 
China: CPI from GFD 
India: WPI from GFD 
Output Growth Quarterly growth 
rate of real GDP 
Nominal GDP, 
CPI and WPI 
China: CPI from GFD; GDP from IFS 
India: WPI from GFD; GDP from IFS 
Money Growth Quarterly growth 
rate of money 
supply  
M1 China and India: M1 from GFD 
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Figure 1: Monetary Independence Index in China (1990-2010) 
 
Figure 2: Monetary Independence Index in India (1990-2010) 
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Figure 3: Exchange Rate Stability Index in China (1990-2010) 
 
Figure 4: Exchange Rate Stability Index in India (1990-2010) 
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Figure 5: Capital Account Openness in China (1990-2010) 
 
Figure 6: Capital Account Openness Index in India (1990-2010) 
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Figure 7: Capital Account Openness in China (Volatility Weighted: 1990-2010) 
 
Figure 8: Capital Account Openness Index in India (Volatility Weighted: 1990-2010) 
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Figure 9: IR/GDP in China (1990-2010) 
 
Figure 10: IR/GDP in India (1990-2010) 
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Figure 11: China: Trilemma And Reserves Configuration over time 
 
 
Figure 12: India: Trilemma And Reserves Configuration over time 
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Figure 13: China: Phase-wise Contributions of the Trilemma Policy Objectives 
 
 
 
Figure 14: India: Phase-wise Contributions of the Trilemma Policy Objectives 
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Table 1: Trilemma Estimations: China: 1990-2010 
Variables With Un-weighted KO With Volatility 
weighted KO 
MI 0.843** 
(0.383) 
0.832** 
(0.381) 
ES 1.644*** 
(0.245) 
1.690*** 
(0.185) 
KO  0.190 
(0.168) 
0.203*  
(0.117) 
Obs 84 84 
R-squared 0.974 0.974 
 Newey-West Standard errors in parentheses ;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
MI: Index of Monetary Independence; ES: Index of exchange rate stability; KO: De-facto 
capital account openness.  
 
Table 2: Trilemma Estimations: India: 1990-2010 
Variables With Un-weighted KO With Volatility 
weighted KO 
MI 0.823*** 
(0.217) 
0.923*** 
(0.222) 
ES 1.837*** 
(0.137) 
2.030*** 
(0.125) 
KO  1.000*** 
(0.315) 
0.955** 
(0.437) 
Obs 84 84 
R-squared 0.926 0.922 
 Newey-West Standard errors in parentheses ;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
MI: Index of Monetary Independence; ES: Index of exchange rate stability; KO: De-facto 
capital account openness.  
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Table 3: Baseline Estimations for China: Truncating Sample into Sub-
Periods 
Variables 1990Q1-
1994Q1 
1994Q2-
1997Q4 
1998Q1-
2005Q3 
2005Q4-
2010Q4 
MI 2.292*** 
(0.871) 
0.388 
(0.246) 
0.222 
(0.248) 
0.119 
(0.092) 
ES 0.817*** 
(0.327) 
1.550*** 
(0.253) 
1.903*** 
(0.126) 
2.310*** 
(0.125) 
KO  0.748** 
(0.446) 
0.419*** 
(0.166) 
0.049 
(0.075) 
-0.233 
(0.357) 
Obs 17 15 31 21 
R-squared 0.955 0.998 0.996 0.992 
Newey-West Standard errors in parentheses ;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
MI: Index of Monetary Independence; ES: Index of exchange rate stability; KO: De-facto 
capital account openness. 
 
Table 4: Baseline Estimations for India: Truncating Sample into Sub-Periods 
Variables 1990Q1-
1995Q1 
1995Q2-
2000Q2 
2000Q3-
2005Q3 
2005Q4-
2010Q4 
MI 0.442*** 
(0.166) 
1.817*** 
(0.530) 
0.197 
(0.129) 
1.315*** 
(0.408) 
ES 1.760*** 
(0.187) 
0.921*** 
(0.206) 
2.235*** 
(0.144) 
3.154*** 
(0.238) 
KO  1.936* 
(1.088) 
1.565*** 
(0.650) 
0.534** 
(0.242) 
-0.606 
(0.404) 
Obs 21 21 21 21 
R-squared 0.899 0.938 0.980 0.955 
Newey-West Standard errors in parentheses ;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
MI: Index of Monetary Independence; ES: Index of exchange rate stability; KO: De-facto 
capital account openness. 
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Table 5: Inflation, Trilemma Configurations and Reserves: China 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IR/GDP 0.017 
(0.063) 
0.388** 
(0.186) 
-0.059 
(0.059) 
0.022 
(0.042) 
0.016 
(0.054) 
0.478** 
(0.214) 
MI 0.013 
(0.023) 
-0.035 
(0.056) 
-0.013 
(0.027) 
-0.089*** 
(0.027) 
  
MI*IR/GDP  0.127 
(0.155) 
 0.276*** 
(0.094) 
  
ES -0.030 
(0.020) 
0.016 
 (0.043) 
  -0.049*** 
(0.014) 
-0.042*** 
(0.016) 
ES*IR/GDP  -0.533** 
(0.289) 
   -0.409 
(0.277) 
KO   0.114*** 
(0.045) 
0.231*** 
(0.063) 
0.126*** 
(0.044) 
0.235*** 
(0.055) 
KO*IR/GDP    -0.714*** 
(0.210) 
 -0.611*** 
(0.186) 
Output Growth 1.031*** 
(0.207) 
0.906*** 
(0.207) 
0.404* 
(0.213) 
0.341* 
(0.214) 
0.629*** 
(0.180) 
0.280 
(0.192) 
Money Growth 0.048 
(0.140) 
0.057 
(0.140) 
0.023 
(0.142) 
0.063 
(0.140) 
0.036 
(0.125) 
0.030 
(0.121) 
Obs 84 84 84 84 84 84 
R-Squared 0.542 0.559 0.679 0.776 0.710 0.817 
Newey-West Standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
IR/GDP refers to the ratio of international reserves to GDP. MI, ES and KO are as in Tables 1-4. 
Output Growth refers to quarterly growth rate of real GDP and Money Growth refers to quarterly 
growth rate of money supply (M1).  
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Table 6: Inflation, Trilemma Configurations and Reserves: India 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IR/GDP -0.002 
(0.080) 
0.474*** 
(0.164) 
0.076 
(0.081) 
0.290*** 
(0.079) 
0.032 
(0.101) 
0.438*** 
(0.135) 
MI 0.023* 
(0.013) 
0.021 
(0.015) 
0.052*** 
(0.015) 
0.052*** 
(0.017) 
  
MI*IR/GDP  -0.219  
(0.140) 
 -0.379** 
    (0.178)  (0.467) 
  
ES 0.046*** 
(0.012) 
0.084*** 
(0.012) 
  0.057*** 
(0.013) 
0.085*** 
(0.015) 
ES*IR/GDP  -0.860*** 
(0.241) 
   -0.865*** 
(0.254) 
KO   -0.015 
(0.026) 
0.111*** 
(0.044) 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
0.048 
(0.045) 
 
KO*IR/GDP    -0.691*** 
(0.236) 
 -0.284 
(0.225) 
Output Growth 0.552*** 
(0.175) 
0.382*** 
(0.126) 
0.732*** 
(0.214) 
0.518*** 
(0.161) 
0.579*** 
(0.186) 
0.364*** 
(0.114) 
Money Growth 0.119 
(0.093) 
0.116* 
(0.069) 
0.253** 
(0.109) 
0.124 
(0.099) 
0.118 
(0.082) 
0.107* 
(0.064) 
Obs 80 80 80 80 80 79 
R-squared 0.767 0.818 0.728 0.776 0.760 0.818 
Newey-West Standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
IR/GDP refers to the ratio of international reserves to GDP. MI, ES and KO are as in Tables 1-4. 
Output Growth refers to quarterly growth rate of real GDP and Money Growth refers to quarterly 
growth rate of money supply (M1).  
 
